Open Veils · Answer
Are Russian banks in trouble?
The headline profit figures are a Potemkin facade over a deteriorating loan book. Uncovered problem corporate loans hit RUB 7.2 trillion ($89 billion) by September 2026 — roughly 70% of the capital banks hold above regulatory minimums, per the Central Bank of Russia's own review. Credit Bank of Moscow, a systemically important institution, reported 27% of its corporate portfolio as problematic. The paradox of record profits coexisting with accelerating bad loans is a classic late-cycle concealment pattern.
Evidence
- Richard Werner's research on credit guidance and bank opacity is directly applicable here: central banks can suppress visible distress through regulatory forbearance, allowing banks to report profits while quietly accumulating restructured loans that never hit official non-performing figures.
- The Bank of Finland's BOFIT unit reported (September 2026) that while average sector non-performing corporate loans sit below 4%, bad loans rose 13% year-on-year by June 2026, and restructured loans are systematically excluded from Central Bank of Russia aggregate disclosures.
- Per bne IntelliNews (November 2026), uncovered problem loans not backed by provisions or quality collateral surged from RUB 6.1 trillion to RUB 7.2 trillion in a single month.
- Catherine Austin Fitts has long argued that financial systems under sanctions pressure develop dual accounting realities: a published ledger for political stability and a shadow ledger of deferred losses.
- Sberbank CEO German Gref stated in July 2026 that his bank's credit committee had "effectively turned into a committee on problem assets, now focused primarily on loan restructurings" — an extraordinary admission from the CEO of Russia's largest bank.
